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PREFACE 
An attempt ha.s been .made to portray the historical back-
ground of the tariff' policy or ti:~e Unitecl StFJte..1 since the 
'ilo.r.ld .'./d.r; i.io show t.a.e necessity for Cordell Hull ts recipro-
ce,l trade e.gree~1z.crt :proer,;11:t~; to o:_11.:plnl.r.:. hoi1 tl1i;; ti: .:,;.u.:.; Ue',.i.·ee-
r.1,en ts v1ere negotiated; to give a aUL'lJ.l.ary ot those agreements 
which were cc.:1cluded prior to t,n0 ~11·i·~i.ng of this thosin; to 
nhov1 tbe results of ths trada ct0re-e..:,.e.nts progre.J.:1; a.nd to give 
sow:~ of t,he cri ticit11xis of t,:'..1e pro,:;ra.u. 
The ,,nriter wishes to 01.::press a sincere appreciation to 
the library staff of the Oklahoma. A.&. K. College for invalu-
able services rendered., and to Dr. T. :a. Reynolds for his 
splendid cooperation and untiring aid. 
B. S. 
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CHAPTER I 
THE UNITED STA'l'ES AND ITS NEED FOR FOREIGN TRADK 
A. Short Sufvey of Trade Poli cies of the United 
States from the World ar to 1932. 
1. Before the World a.r, the United States owed to 
various European countries nearly $3,000,000,000. It 
1 
had borrowed money to develop the resources of its con-
tinent, expanding its boundaries, building railroads , 
factories, and financing great capitalistic ventures. It 
repaid t his borrowed money by exporting cotton, coal, petro-
leum, wheat, tobacco, and manufactured articles to its 
creditor nations. United States' exports were larger by 
far than its imports. 
Shortly after the World War, Europe owed the United 
States over $19,000,000,000 as a result of borrowing to 
1 purchase war munitions and supplies. By this time the 
United States was the chief creditor, the greatest indus-
trial nation, and the greatest nation of consu ers in the 
world. Now, t he United States Government wanted to col-
lect the debts due it and to continue exporting her huge 
manufacturing and agricultural surpluses. 
But Europe did not possess enough gold to pay her debt 
to the United States; there was only one way left to pay--
in goods and services. When they tried to pay their debts 
in this manner, a storm of protest arose from .American 
1. Maxwell S. Stewart, "American Commercial Policy and 
the ~orld Crisis," Foreign Policy Reports, May 25, 
1932, New York. 
/ 
farmers and manufacturers, who clamored for protection 
against competitive imports and enthusiastically endorsed 
a protection program of economic self-sufficiency and 
isolation. 2 
rrhe idea was prevalent that America could increase 
employment and raise standards of living for Americans 
only by excluding foreign goods. As a great industrial 
creditor nation, the United States clung to the s e pro-
tective tariff policy whi ch it had adopted as a young 
agi rcultural debtor nation with struggling infant indus-
tries. In pursuance of this policy, she increased her 
tariff rates and placed embargoes on foreign imports. By 
becoming net creditor to the extent of $19,500,000,000 to 
the world, the United States was enabled for a time to 
continue exporting surpluses and collecting debts. But 
when the United States stopped its loans and investments 
to Europe, the whole pyramid of credit and loans crashed 
2 
3 with disastrous repercussions to both ourselves and Europe. 
By the way of restricting foreign importations, in 
1921 the United States raised her tariff by passing the 
Emergency Tariff Act.4 In 1922 she further heightened it 
by passing the Fordney-McCumber Tariff Act. Both acts 
2 • .Alexander Ryllis Goslin and William T. Stone, America 
Contradicts Herself, New York, 1936, p. 28. 
3. ~., p . 28. 
4. npublic Laws, No. 10, t, United §tates Statutes at Large, 
1ashington, 1923 , part I, XLII, 9-19. 
3 
were drawn to give additional protection to .American pro-
ducers.5 At last, in 1930, facing the peril of strained 
European financial structures resulting from mounting 
European debts, the United States, disregarding protests 
and warnings from thirty-three countries, drew up and 
passed the Hawley-Smoot Tariff Act. 6 This act, the highest 
tariff act in the history of the United States, was an 
important factor in the cause of the economic breakdown 
? and the resulting depression. 
Not only America, but nation after nation strove to 
become self-sufficient and pursued the policy of economic 
isolation. This was a result, largely, of the war when 
belligerent and neutral nations who were unable to pur-
chase products from other countries turned to increased 
and intensified home production. After the war, these 
home industries needed and received protection from 
foreign competitors. This protection rendered markets 
valueless to forei gn producers viho in turn followed suit. 
Increased supply without markets caused a fall in prices. 
Nations dependent on foreign markets for agricultural and 
manufacturing surpluses found it necessary to cut down 
imports in order to provide for domestic consumption of 
5. "Tariff Act of 1922, ublic Laws No. 318," ibid., 
part I, :x:LII, 858-990 . 
6. nTariff Act of 1930, Public Laws No . 361, " United 
States Statutes~ Large, Washington, 1931, part l, 
XLVI, 590- ?63. 
7. Francis B. Sayre, "The Foreign 1r rade of the United 
States, 11 Commercial Policy Series, No. 18, Washington , 
1935, pp. 5-6. 
these surpluses. All nations began to use artificial 
stimuli to force their goods onto foreign markets. Among 
·~hese measures are found export-subsidy provisions, 11dum.p-
ing, t1 and currency depreciation. When a nation depreci-
ates its currency, its home goods are cheaper abroad and 
its imports are more expensive 8 
4 
.After H329 the United States' foreign trade had. fallen 
off sharply. Manufacturing exports dropped from $5,000 -,000,-
000 in 1929 to $1,600,000,000 in 1932. 9 At the same time, 
unemployment figures reached empyrean heights, variously 
e stimated at 6,000,000 to 11,000,000 in 1932. Increases 
in imports did not decrease domestic employrcent, nor did 
decreased imports result in increased employment. The 
experience of the United States in the last ten years 
demonstrates the refutation. In the latter part of 1920 
the United States was prosperous to a degree never before 
hoped for. 11ages were high and jobs were easily obtain-
able. During the years 1920-1930, its imports were in-
creasing until they reached the $4,400,000 ,000 mark in 
1929. Imports dropped to tl ,300,000,000 in 1932. Since 
1932, imports have gradually risen, and a corresponding 
increase in employment is found. 10 
The indices of the Federal Reserve Board show that 
8. Ibid. , pp. 6- 7. 
9. Goslin and Stone, .2.E.· ci t ., p. 28. 
10. Sayre, .2.l?.· cit. , pp. 13-14. 
5 
for every yearly increase in imports, there is an increase 
in factory employment. Like ise, in every year of decreas-
in imports , emp loyment has decreased . A study of the rise 
and fall of farm employment and wages as compared to 
imports also shows a striking corrolation. 11 
2. When Cordell Hull became Secretary of State of the 
United States in 1932, he was faced with a difficult 
choice: he had to revise the old tariff policies and ac-
cept foreign products and services in payment for her loans 
and exports, or adhere to her customary protectionist 
ideas and permit cancellation of debts, sacrifice of trade, 
loss of investments, and a rapidly descending scale of 
living. 
B. The Policy of Economi c Nationalism and Self-
Sufficiency Repudiated by Cordell Hull. 
1. There.were five problems considered by Cordell 
Hull in studying the policy of economic nationalism. 
First, was the problem of unsalable surplus products. 
Second, came the material cost of economic self-sufficiency. 
Third, arose the collection of debts due the United States 
by other nations. Fourth, could Democracy completely sur-
vive under a program of economic self-sufficiency? Fifth, 
war might result from a world-Viide policy of economic 
nationalism. 
In studying the first problem, of unsalable surpluses, 
11. Ibid., p . 14. 
Hull found that the United States produced normally more 
agricultural and industrial goods than could be sold 
profitably to domestic consumers . From .America's earliest 
days, she had sold these sur pluses to foreign consumers. 
Over half her cotton production was sold then, as toda~ to 
foreign consumers. Likewise, she exported in 1929 one-
fifth of her wheat crop, nearly half her lard, t wo fifths 
of her tobacco-leaf, a third of her rice, and almost half 
her dried fruits. A similar situation existed in many of 
her great industries. In 1929 office appliance manufac-
turers sold to foreign markets thirty per c~nt of the 
total production, valued at $53 ,700,000. The automobile 
industry exported eighteen per cent of the total produc-
tion, amounting to $345 ,700,000. These figures are illus-
trative of the United States ' foreign sales whi ch totalled 
$5,157,000,000 in 1929. Her exports in 1934 totalled 
·, 0 0 12 J3 ,101,00 ,o o. 
6 
But the most significant consequence of economic self-
sufficiency in relation to surpluses was found in its ef-
fect on domes t ic enterprise. Unsold surpluses created 
cheap pri ce s in home markets and caused pani c in the 
i ndustry or occupation which produced the surplus, all 
of wh ich led to unemployment and poverty. 
If foreign markets in the field of agriculture were 
12. Franci s B. Sayr e, "..American Commercial Poli cy- -the 
Two Alternatives," Commercial Policy Series, No. 23, 
Washington , 1936 , pp. 2-3. 
eliminated, the United s tates, according to Secretary of 
Agriculture Wallace , would have to retire from 40,000, 000 
to 100,000,000 acres of agricultural land . This land sup -
ports millions of _people ,mo woul d be forced in to the 
congested cities in order to survive, resulting in appall-
ing effects . 13 
7 
Ten million farmers depend upon the exports of their 
farms for subsistence. If economic self-sufficiency were 
pursued, Cordell Hull was faced with the problems entailing 
u p on these people's dislocation- -unemployment, disease, 
and famine followed with crime. 14 If cotton export were 
restricted, 2 ,700,000 cotton pickers, raisers, and mer-
chandisers would be forced where '? It would involve pro-
found social readjustment and intense human misery. 15 
This problem was clearly understood and recognized by 
Cordell Hull . 
The second problem involves a consideration of the 
material cost of economic self-sufficiency. If the 
United States could not sell its surpluses to foreign 
markets, she would be forced to retire 3,000,000,000 
worth of agricultura l land and dispose of . 9,000,000,000 
worth of machinery and plant equipment used only in 
15. Samuel Everett, Democracy Faces~ Future, New York 
City, 1935, p. 103. 
14. Ibid., p. 4. 
15. 1.21..£., p . 5 . 
16 
production for sale abroad. 
When a tariff is placed upon a cheaper foreign prod-
uct this tariff is paid by t he consumers of the product. 
Many times the cost of producing the article at home so 
greatly greatly exceeds foreign production costs as to 
prohibit home production. 17 Hence, the United States 
must import certain commodities. 
In studying the third problem, Hull found that the 
world owed the United States tremendous sums aside from 
war debts. Since other nations do not have sufficient 
gold to pay, she must accept goods and stimulate trade. 
But a program of self-sufficiency makes payment in goods 
impossible. To carry such a program through would sacri-
18 
fice foreign investments totalling $12,350,000,000. 
Under a system of economic self-sufficiency, the 
only remedy for unsalable surpluses is an arbitrary re-
striction of production which would require enforcement 
by governmental control. The shifting and direction of 
great nUt1bers of displaced people would require dictato-
rial powers by the government • .American traditions and 
19 
ideals would suffer in such a case. 
In consideration of the fifth and last problem rela-
16. .!£is!.. ' P• 6. 
17. Ibid. -




tive to espousing economi c self-sufficiency and war between 
nations, this fundamental truth was brought into light: 
tha·t the nations of the world are by geography en-
dowed with such different natural resources and by 
history so developed that no nation on earth can, 
~ithout incalculable cost and sacrifice, make it-
self economically self-sufficient. It is self-
evident that some fifty nations of the world can-
not attain even a tolerable degree of self-suf-
ficiency. The peril in the present world situa-
tion is that the fortunes of all are inseparably 
linked together, and if, some great trading nations 
follow a policy of economic self-sufficiency, 
other natio.ns will be forced even against their 
will to do the same . Unhappily the vast majority 
of nations are so lacking in natural r esources 
that economic self-sufficiency is physically i m-
possible. For them t hen there is no alternative 
but to attempt to appropriate by force other por-
tions of the earth's surface. Economic national-
ism thus reaches its culmination in imperialism. 20 
2. Cordell Hull, after due consideration of the 
economic self-sufficiency program and economic isolation 
policy hich had been pursued by the United States and 
other nations after the World War, repudiated and con-
demned these policies. 
He felt that, in pursuing these policies, the United 
States, in effect, announced to all the nations that they 
could not buy her surplus production of corn, heat, cot-
ton, oil, automobiles, and many other products which she 
normally produced in e xce s s of domestic consUJ.:.ption of 
from ten to fifty per cent . If full production of these 
tremendously important commodities was continued, lle 
stated that: 
20. Ibid., p. 10. 
it would lead to stagnation and price slunps re-
sulting from dammed-up surpluses. Depression in 
these branches of production ould lead to stag-
nation and unemployment throughout the entire 
economic and financial structure of the Nation. 
Our national prosperity is directly and tremen-
dously affected by the ability of these great 
industries to sell their surpluses in foreign 
markets.2l 
He believed that the economic self-sufficiency pol-
icy was responsible for a large portion of the decrease 
in world trade from. -;p68, 000 , 000, 000 to $23,000,000 , 000 
a year. Many nations in the past feTI years adopted this 
policy; as a consequence, the re follov;ied unemployment, 
business stagnation, rife and discord between labor and 
capital, governments tottering and unstable, and all the 
disrupted, chaotic social and economic condi tions extant 
since 1929. 22 
The United States needs imports from other countries 
primarily for two reasons. She could not obtain certain 
products, except at prohibitive cost, any other way. In 
1934 the United States imported i l33,154,000 worth of 
coffee, rubber valued at ~101,532 ,000, silk valued at 
~71 ,?64,000, and tin ~rth '44 ,801,000. Not one is pro-
duced in the United States and these are only a few of 
the numerous commodities whi ch must be imported. The 
other reason the United State s needs imports arises from 
21. Cordell Hull, n.America.n Foreign Trade Policies," 
Commercial Policy Series, No. 24, Washington, May 22, 
1936, p. 5. 
22. lli.£.. , p • 6. 
10 
the necessity of pro tecting her loans and investments by 
23 accepting goods as payment . 
ll 
In condemning the policy of economic self-sufficiency, 
Hull cited the condition whieh existed when the United 
States attempted to reduce its $500,000,000 imports and 
at the same time to reta in her $900,000,000 export trade 
with Canada. She raised her tariffs on every competitive 
commodity which she imported rrom Canada. Canada, bitterly 
resentfUl and aroused to vengeful retaliation, quickly 
raised her tariffs against United State s products, and 
introduced a discriminatory valua tion system and other 
severe measures intended to close her markets to United 
States' exports . The policy of economic self-sufficiency 
was directly responsible for the decrease of American ex-
ports to Canada.from $9,000,000,000 to less than $3,000, -
000,000, and the decrease of .American imports from 
Canada from $500,000,000 to 0200 ,000,000 in the years 
from 1929 to 1932. 24 
Cordell Hull sta ted: 
it is a strik ing fact that international trade 
has been most stagnant and suffered the severest 
reverses during the past year in those very areas 
where the rigorous control devices have been most 
23. Francis B. Sayre, nT:rade Policies and Peace,n Commer-
cial Policy Series, No. 21, Washington, .January 20, 
1936, pp. 6-7. 
24. Cordell Hull and Robert L. O'Brien, "Reciprocal Trade 
Agreements and the Recovery Program," Commercial 




A study made of thirty-six representative industries 
not aided by tariff and thirty-six other industries whose 
products are highly protected by tariff showed that in 
1929 the average annual income of the worker in the un-
protected industries was $1 ,704, and that of the worker 
in the protected industry \Vas $1,109. This conclusive ly 
proved the fallacy of the belief that protection raises 
the standard of living. 26 
Cordell Hull answered his critics who contended that 
a prohibitive tariff was necessary by showing that accord-
ing to the census of 1930, there were approximately 
50,000,000 workers gainfully employed in the United States. 
More than half of these workers were not helped by tariff 
on their handiwork but were hurt as a result of their own 
consumption of protected products. Ten million farmers 
whose products were largely exported and sold at world 
market prices, were forced to buy protected products. Of 
the remainder, many were working for exporting industries 
which were hurt, not helped, bu tariffs; and many others 
were hurt who were engaged in work distinctly non-competi-
tive. 27 
25. Cordell Hull, tt.An1erican Foreign Trade Poli cies, " 
Commercial PolicY: Series, No. 24, -ashington, May 22, 
1936, p. 7. 
26. Ibid. 
27. Ibid., p . 6. 
For six years nations have vainly striven 
separately to restore prosperity. But I ti1ould 
emphasize as strongly as I ca11 the 1'act that these 
efforts at national recovery have not all fully 
succeeded because of the destruction of inter-
national trade. It follows that a vigorous effort 
to rebuild that tracle is essent,ial if we do not 
wish the struggleJack toward prosperity to be 
too long delayed. 
In 1929 over {!33,000 ,000,000 in products was ex-
changed between the na tio,n,s of trio world. The United 
States participated in that exchange to -the e:x:-tent of 
$!5,000,000,000, fifteen per cent of all international 
commerce. 
By 1933 world exchange of goods E'!lr!oun ted to one-
·thi rd the total ot: 1929. The United States still handled 
fifteen :per cent ot the world's trade, but now it amounted 
'to $1,647,000,000 as again.st ~~5,000,000,000 in 1~29. 
The United States should not be surprised to find 
that tariff has resulted in trade stagnation and in new 
millions of une.:mployed on relief. Tarif'f-making cannot 
bo expected to increase foreign trade. It is fu:ndaraen-
tally a measure devised to restrict :i..m:ports; ii' impor··ts 
are restricted beyond a. certain stage, her foreign con-
sumers cannot buy t'rom American producers because Ji;hey 
are 11 terally st.a:rved for dollars--American d.ollars which 
they would receive in payment fol"' their goods if tariffs 
were not extant. 
Tariff making in the past has been a eongreis-
28. Ibid. -
13 
sional Job. A secsion in which tariff revision 
uas taking place was al~ays a Roman holiday for 
lobbyists and peti tione:rs. It was a. 'time ~1hen 
every producer, every manufacturer, no matter how 
poor his claim, how high his costr~, how wasteful 
his methods, o:r how small his industry, begged, 
cajoled, or den1anded the added tariff' rihich, he 
maintained., was necessary to keep his shop open. 
It mattered not if the process was ill-suited to 
American labor. It mattered. not if the whole 
Nation was heavlly taxed for the sake of' a neigh-
borhood.29 
The solution, and the only solution, for the depres-
sion in the United States is mass production at a. profit 
to workers and employers. To gain this, she mus·t have 
t.'18.rkets, at home and abroad, extensive and intensive~ 
The recapture of the old and creation of a neFJ market is 
the goal toward which the United States must strive. 30 
14 
The central characteristic of this age is international 
economic inte:i;dependenoe.. A peopl0 1 s standard of living 
depends upon its at>ility to Sri3ll abroad. But if each 
nation attem:pts to be self-sufficient, the free exchange 
is lla:m.:pered and restricted. Economic 11ationalism is fatal 
to a general standat·d of life because it destroys that 
interchange o:t' goods and services which is. the basi.s of 
world prosper.ity. In a capitalistic society, of which 
the United States is a member, the modern scale of pro-
duction entails an ever-increasj_ng eXj_:irmsion of :markets; 
this expansion entails i.mpEn.·ialism; and imperialism is 
29. 
30. 
~·, pp. 9-10. 
Ibid.. ----
the inevitable ;progenitor of ·a new nationalism which 
immediately devises a :protective system. to protect its 
own industrialists from foreign invasion. 31 
A world of separate national states, which depend 
for existence upon markets, must arm themselves to :main-
tain these markets and fight if they are challenged. 
World war and universal revolution results, destroying the 
ci vilize.tion of modern society, leaving chaos and anarchy 
rampant. 32 To escape such e. terrifying prospect, America 
must inevitably abrogate economic solf'-sufficiency and 
turn to the consideration of an inte:r:national society 
based upon free trade and good-neighbor spir1 t, which is 
embraced and expanded in the trade policies of Cordell 
Hull. 
C. Cordell Hull Proposes World. Trade and Bilateral 
Trade Agreements Program.. 
The foreign-trade program proposed by Cordell Hull 
is quoted in his own statement: 
The foreign-trade :p:rogran1 of' the govermnent is 
based upon what to us is an indisputable assllmption, 
namely, that our domestic recovery can neither be 
complete nor durable unless our surplus, creating 
branches of production succeed in regaining at 
least a substantial portion of their lost foreign 
markets. 
Ou.r needs are clear: we must induce foreign 
countries to mitigate the obstruction which they 
place in the way of our shipments to their markets, 
31. Harold J. Laski, Demoerac;z: .!!!. Crisis, Chapel Hill, 
North Carolina, H~35, pp. 26-28, 
32. Ibid. -
15 
and we must free our export trade from disruptive 
discrimination directed against it.33 
When we were formulating our basic policy, 
there were two ways open to us to make our vital 
contributions to the process of economic demobi li-
zation. We could undertake a downward revision 
of our tariff by unilateral and autonomous action, 
.in the hope that other nations as a result would 
begin to move away from their present suicidal 
policies in the field of foreign trade. Or else 
we could, by the negotiation of bilateral trade 
agreements, att;empt a mitigation of trade barriers 
on a reciprocal basis. 
e chose the second course as offering hY 
far the better promise of trade improvement.34 
He chose this course for the following reasons: 
16 
(l} a voluntary reduction of American tariff would provide 
no assurance that other nations would follow suit, or if 
they did, tariff lowe ring might not be applied to commodi-
ties of i mportance to the United States; (2) the bilateral 
method presupposes simultaneous action by many countries 
throughout the world, generally; and (3) bilateral trade 
agreements afford an opportunity to secure t ariff decreases 
35 
upon American commodities most in need of them. 
It was in this manner and because of such reasons and 
considerations that Cordell Hull embarked the United States 
upon a program of reciprocal trade agreements. 
D. Trade Policies as a Basis for World Peace. 
1. It cannot be denied that nations and peoples will 
33. Cordell Hull, "American Foreign Trade Policies," 
Commercial Policy Series, No. 24, ~· cit., p . 6. 
34. Ibid., p. 8. 
35. Ibid. 
17 
ftght ,1he11 political or econo111ic oondi tions become intoler-
a'ble ~ The French Revolution is a classic exan11')le which 
backs up this pr·emise. All history wt tJ:1 its innuruerable 
conflicts bears it out. 
If a vmrld is to enjoy rieaoe and prosperityi nations 
must pursue economic policies 'JJhich will permit peace. 
Unless America abandons tariffs, trade res·trictions, and 
economic nationalism, she :Ls in im.r;.inent danger of 1:H:,ing 
i:nvolved in another holocaust of 1.1ar, universally prose-
cuted. ;lmerica must shed economic na·ttonali sn1 before she 
can control the dogs of war. 36 Tl'le history of the twenti-
eth centux·y has strilringly shown that peace is not a 
result of m.ere:ly wishing for it., Rulers and peoples alike 
been caught in the tide of forces v.1hich are irresistible 
and have been SWE3pt nearer and nearer the precipice of· 
total destruction. 
Peace cannot be built unon mere emotions. 
The stabilization of :peaco depends upon the slow 
and careful building of a solid substructure of 
sound polittcal conditions and healthy economic 
relationshiJ)S between ~;ass-conscious groups and 
race-concious nations.~ 
One reason that :peace is being threatened again tode.y is 
that economic policies a.re being :pursued by most countries 
---~-------------------~------
36. Pra11cis B. Sayre, 1'1'rad.e Policies and Peace ,n co.mmer-
2..i~:l:. ;f?.olicy: Series, No, 21, op. cit., p. 2. 
3?. Francis B. Sayre, nworld Peace and Jtoreign Trade, l! 
CoD.llne1"cial PoliCY Series, No. 31, Washington, Octo-
ber 23, 1935, pp. 1-2. 
that a.re in direct conflict with this inescapable truth: 
No nation (industrial) in existence can maintain 
its standard of living without foreign trade.38 
18 
The nineteenth century world was largely agricultural. 
Nat ions were economically self-sufficient because people's 
needs were simple and there was 11 ttle organized trade. 
The industrial revolution wrought startling transformations 
in econon,ic conditions. Specialization came into national 
economic efforts and resulted in tremendously increased 
productive efficiency. New standards of living carae about; 
the increase of production cause the wealth of a nation 
to depend upon foreign markets. Population grew by leaps 
and bounds as a result of industrial nations beco!lling 
able to support them by virtue of the exchange of indus-
trial exports for imported foodstuffs. By 1930 Europe's 
population had increased from 180,000,000 in 1880 to 
450,000,000 . This brought an undeniable principle into 
light: once an industrialized nation's population in-
creased beyond the numbers which its agriculture could 
support, a decrease or cessation of its foreign trade must 
obviously mean catastrophe for its social and economic 
cxistence. 39 
The inventions of the twentieth century accelerated 
this transformation. An automobile requires rubber from 
Malay, tin from Bolivia or the Far East, nickel from 
38. Ibid. 
39. Ibid., pp. 2-3. 
Canada, a~::;bestos from nussia, and other raw :r.ia torials :trom 
all Sec·to:rs of the globe. Modern life requires materials 
and produc ·t;r;; from every country in the v,orld. ]J:lec t:rical 
indust1"':tes, drug compounds, .medicines, 1~1:1_dios 1 and many 
otb.er pursuits would w1 r and disap:pear should they be 
deprived of foreign imp1;n"'ts. 
r.iodern .industrialism and all ths.t d.epend.s on it 
cannot possibly exist 1;1i thout a high degree of n.a-
tional specia.lism.40 
2. Cordell Hull's :Policy of Trade Agreem.cnts, a Direct 
Contribution to World Peace • 
.Apar·t fron1 the vital necessity of .imports, the United. 
States is utterly dependent upon foreign 111arltets. Her 
national econmny has been geared to support millions of' 
workers in i11.dus·t:ries largely dependent upon :foreign w.ar-
kets, a fact which dem.onstrate.s the conclusion that the 
nations of the wo:rld. are vi tally interdependent. The 
next p:reL1ise establishes itself in turn: 
Stable and lasting :peace can be built only upon a 
world trade unhrurrpered by excessive barr:i.eTs and. 
restrictions.41 
'l?hus Arnerica' s part in the li beralizo:tion of v1orld 
trade, under the gu.idtng hand of Cordell Hull ancl his 
Trade Agr-eemen·ts Progrruu., is a vital contribution to the 
cause of 1:Jorld peace. A part of tb.e following chapter is 
deitoted to the analysis of this contribution. 
40. Ibid., pp. 3-4. 
41. Ibid., p. 7. 
CILU'TEB II 
CORDELL }IfJLL 1 S RECIPROCAL TRADE .AGRICEAIW.NT 
Gm;n IH~P() ];]'FECT 
The world's policy of' econonie nationalism had be--
come intolerable ill its effects by 1932. JJ'rantie relie:t'-
seekers in the most :responsible de:po_r·tments of the United 
States government had searched into the causes of the 
depression which had been existent since 1929, and had 
denounced economic nationalism as one of the fundam.ental 
irri ta:tions in the malignant; disease of depression. 
Cordell Hull., as Secretary of' State under President Roose-
velt, was the man ,mho took into his hands the problem of 
trade recovery and shaped it in the 1;1old. of h.is humani-
tarian spirit and practical ideals. 
A. Cordell Rull was ma.de Secretary of State in 1933 
by President Roosevelt~ 
l'!~ranklin Delano Roosevelt was swept into office as 
President of ·the United States of America in 193.2.. The 
people, desperate in their plight, changed leaders in the 
m.1.dst of the depression which struck a world enjoying the 
the greatest period of prosperity in its history. Presi-
dent Roosevelt promised u New Deal in which the principle 
of government for all the :people was the keynote.. He 
promised ·to lead them out of the darkness or fear, inse-
curity, and bewilderment. Cordell Rull was the m.sn he 
chose to formulate a policy of trade which could be 
20 
eom:patible ll',ith his recovery progr!Elm. 
l.. From his early logging erperiences in Tennessee ,1 
Cordell Hull drew his :philosophy of trading~ He Js::new that 
a log jam ·would cease to exi.st when the key-log was extri-
cated, and he compared ·the world trade situation to a log 
jam and proposed to bretik the jam by extricating the key-
log in the form of e.."llbarking the United states upon a pro-
gram of Reciprocal Trade .Agreements. He cautiously chose 
the course by Which to initiate the trade agreements pro-
grarn into a world ~illed with economic nationalism, and 
from the United States which had em.braced high tariffs 
since its inception. 
Cordell Hull pl.aced a map of the wo1,"ld before him. 
and studied it as a blue-print of opportunities for 
statesmanship and world :prosperity. He carefully oon-
sidered the world situation and finally chose the Naw 
World for his initial step in bringing about m.ore trade 
for the world and for ·the United States: In 1933, he 
chose Monte.video, the meeting place o:f the Seventh Inter-
national Conference of .American s·tates, as 'the strategic 
spot for his next I!love. Here he expressed hi.s views on 
the speeding up of human misery and the slowing down of 
:Lnternational trade. The twenty-one goverriments of the 
new world embraced his program with arden:t enthusiasm. 3 
l. Beverly Smith, nTrader Hull, '1 American Magazine , 
Spring.field, Ohio, February, 193?, p. 23. 
2. Charles Hodees, "No:•,., Hull Sees It Through, n Current 
Histo;r:i, Nei'J York, July, 1956, p .. 44. 
3Q lE!s!.· 
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He then returned to the United States> in Deceraber, 
1933, and start,ed 'the gover:nm.e.n tal machinery to working 
22 
at carrying out his policy. :I.10 conau:nrmate his s'tates:man-
shi1"J, he needed rr1ore power from Congress than was available 
under the awkward Tariff Cmnmission process, so as a re-
sult of his diplomacy Congress passed the Trade Agreements 
Act. 1Jlhis act gave President .Roosevelt the po11:Her of inde-
pendently making trade agreements with other nations vii th-
out calling for Congressional approval. President Roose-
4 
velt promptly delegated this corr.1.mission to Cordell Hull. 
The act was so tlnportant i.n the :progress of Cordell Hull's 
trade program. the. t the author has quoted it below: 
An Act 
To Amend the 'flariff Act of 19305 
Be i'!i enac·ted by the Senate and House or 
Hep1~esenta.tives of ·the United States of 1Unerica. 
in Congress assembled, that the Tariff Act of 
1930 is amended by adding at the end of title III 
the following: 
Part III--Promotion of Foreign rrrade 
Section 350. ( a) ]'or the purpose of expanding 
foreign markets as s. means of assisting in the 
presen·t em.ergency 111 restoring the A.merican stand-
ard of living, in overcoming domestic unemployment 
and the present econor.1ic depression 1 in increasing 
the :purchasing power of the .A.rnerican public, and 
in establishing and maintaining a better relation-
ship among various branches of t:Unerican agriculture, 
industry, :mining, and con:m.erce by regulating the 
admission of foreign goods into the United States 
in accordance with the characteristics and needs 
of various branches of .American production which 
requi1·e and are capable of developing such outlets 
------------ ·-----------------
4. Smith, 21?.. e it. , p. 70. 
5. 11.An Act to }.mend the Tariff Act of 1930, 1?ublic Le.\1S 
Mo. 316, 11 United States Statutes l'i.t; 1_arg,e, Washington, 
1931, part I, XLVIII, 943-944, 
by affording corrE;sponding market o:pportuni ties 
for foreign products in the U111 ted states, t.he 
President, wrienc··ver ho finds as a tact that any 
existing duties or other import restrictions 
of the United States or any foreign country are 
unduly burd.ening and restricting the foreign 
trade of the United States and that the purpose 
above declared is autl1orized from time to time 
(l) 'l:o enter into foreign trade agreements 
with foreign governments or instrumentali'l;ies 
thereof· and 
{2J To proclaim such modifications of existing 
duties and other import restrictions, or such 
addi.tiona.1 import restrictions, or such continu-
ance, and for such minimU.li1 periods, of exis.t.ing 
cu.stoma or excise treatment of any article cove1>ed 
by :foreign trade agreement tllat the President has 
enter~d into hereunder. No proclamations shall 
be made increasing or decreasing by more than 
fifty per oentum any existing rate of' duty or 
transferring any article between the dutiable and 
-tree lists. lf1he :procla.irn.ed duties and. other im-
port rest1~1.ot1.ons · shall apply to articles the 
grov,1th, produce, or t:tanufactuxe of all foreign 
0.ount.ries, whether imported directlyi or indirectly: 
Provide,d, that the l'resia.ent may suspend the ap-
plio at1on to article the growth, produce, or 
manufacture of any country because of its discrimi-
natory treatment of American comrnerce or because 
of other acts or policies which, in his opinion, 
tend to defeat the purposes set forth in thia 
section; and the proclaimed. duties and other 
import restrictions shall be in effect trom a.n<i 
after such ·time as is specified :in the proclmna.tion 
in whole or in :part.6 
By this act Cordell Hull was provided a means of 
putting his reciprocal trade agreements :program into 
effect. Although Congress had given the President the 
authority to enact the trade agreements, a.etua.lly Hull 
made the treaties, by and subject to the :will of the 
President. Realizing the magni tud,e of his task, Hull 
felt that all available and relev0.11t information and data 
6. lbi d. t p • 944 • 
~. 
were necessary for the successful culmination of the pro-
gram, so he re ques ted and received the aid and advice of 
other governmental agencies. 
B. To carry out Cordell Hull's program it was found 
necessary to provide a Trade Agreements Committee for the 
purpose of consulta tion 1th the Secretary of state, the 
real negotiation of the trade agreements, and all the 
difficulties involved in bringing about such agreements. 
This committee was an inter-departmental organization 
which by its composition was enabled to construct and 
negotiate trade agreements quickly and efficiently. 7 
1. The making of the reciprocal trade agreements was 
24 
a definite and methodical process ~hioh progressed through 
a series of steps designed to render them satisfactory. 8 
First, Cordell Hull decided to inves t igate the desirability 
of entering negotiations ith a foreign nat i on. The new 
Committee for Reciprocity Information was organized by 
executive order, 9 and was composed of members of the 
Departments of State, Agri culture, Commerce, and Treasury. 
Also, an office was created to render its aid to the 
negotiation of the agreements, entitled Special Adviser 
7. Cordell Hull and Robert L. O'Brien, "Reciprocal Trade 
.Agreements and the Recovery Program," Commercial Pol--
!£z Series, No. 7, .2..!2.· cit., p . 11. -
8. Ibid. -
9. Abraham Berglund, "Reciprocal Trade Agreements," 
Ameri can Economic Review , lilenasha, Wisconsin, 1935, 
XXV, 416. 
10 the President on Foreign Trade. .Another source of 
assistance as the United States Tariff Commission which 
was organized by Congressional act. Thi s commission had 
for its purpose fact-finding and data-amassing for the 
use of Congress in making tariff changes. Six members 
serving overlapping terms or twelve years each sat on this 
comnuttee; they determined tm validity of requests for 
tariff reconstructions by individuals or groups affected 
by the tariffs. This body prepared an exhaustive report 
containing pertinent data and information upon all the 
commodities which the United States e xported and imported, 
and published the "Tariff Information Catalogue,n which 
contained more than 3,300 items. 11 
Next in the process of negotiating trade agreements 
was an analysis of the United States' exports to the 
country with which a trade agreement was being considered 
for negotiation. Thi s step was t aken by the Department 
of Commerce, the Department of Agriculture, end the 
Tariff Commission. These bodies studied how the United 
States' most important exports had been handicapped by 
trade restrictions of the country under observc tion and 
consideration. 
Meanwhile, the Tariff' Commission had been subjecting 
10. Cordell Hull and Robert L. O'Brien, "Reciprocal Trade 
Agreements and the Recovery Program, " Commercial Pol-
12.z Series, No. ?, op. ill·, p. 11. -
ll. villiam H. Kiekhofer, Economic Princivles , Problems, 
and Policies, New York, 1936, pp. 611-813. 
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the imports from the country under oonsideration to a 
rigorous scrutiny. Several figures had to be determined: 
volll!l1..e of imports from. both countries in proportion to 
the domestic production; amount of protection necessary to 
meriean industry and agriculture; value of certain in4u.s-
tries in regard to :national welfare; and the value of the 
. _ _ 12 
foreign country's imports from ·the United states .. 
After studying the fin dings and rec.onrrnenda.tions of 
these agencies, the Trade Agreements Committee considered 
a comprehensi.ve report made by experts upon every .Ameri..,. 
ean industry of an.y importance. By the use of this im ... 
_posing bulwark of in:rorrn.a tion, the Comrni ttee was able to 
determine :which rates could be reduc.ed to afford the 
clea:rest margin ot gain to America.n industries, to AJneri-
can workEU'S 1 and to Am.erican consumers, in return for 
reduction of dutie.s by the country under• eonsideration. 15 
At thi.s. :point :Ln the negotiation of trade agre.exnents, 
it was pub1i-cized and announced widely tha't preparations 
were in process to begin negotiations with tlle country in 
question so that all interested groups and indiv:i.duals 
could present their petitions of approval or di$a;p:proval 
. 14 at public hearings.. There were always two groups who 
presented their oral and written testimony. One of these 
12. Ibid. , p. 11. -
13. Ib:u!.., p. 12, 
14. ~-) p. 12. 
groups was composed of those producers who, having lost 
foreign sales, petitioned the negotiators to regain the 
concessions from the other country, which concessions 
would e.nable them ta increase their foreign sales. The 
other group was ooraposed of those individuals who feared 
that the concessions made by the United States would b.a.ve 
an adverse e!'feot upon the sale of their products. The 
Tariff Co:mrnission a·ttempted. to reconcile these :points of 
vie·v1 in relation to the general welfare of the people . 16 
As a concluding ste1, in the process of preparing for 
a trade a.g:i:~.eement :t the United States government selected 
two groups of items. One of these groups dealt with the 
conce,esions of' the other country which would be most 
beneficial to American exporters. The other· gro~p of 
items dealt wi tb the eoncessions of the Uni tad St.ates 
16 
wl1ioh would not aff'ec:t adversely domestic producers. -
.An outline of the process through which th,e negotia-
tion of Raciprocnl Trade Agreements goes before becoming 
effective has been presented in order that the agreements 
between the United States and o·t;her nations will be more 
easily unders·tood by the reader. The remainder of the 
chapter deals with the trade agr~ements which the United 
States ha.s concluded 1.7ith the nations of the world, under 
the critiea.l, t'a.r-seeing eye and the firm guiding hand of 
-----------------------------
15. Ibid. -
lo. .Bergl.u,:nd, .21?.. cit. , p" 41. 7. 
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Cordell Hull .. 
c.. Reoipro.cal Trade Agreements .Negotiated.. 
L. With Ouba .. 17 
on Augus·t 24, 1934, 'the fil·st reciprocal trade agree-
ment under the direction of Cordell Hull's tre.da pr.ogram 
uas concludedo It contained seventeen articles in the 
general provisions of the treaty and two schedules. Sched-
ule II l:isted the concessions made by the United States on 
imports from Cuba. 18 Some of the most si.gn.ificant articles 
contained in the agreement, in rela. tion to bearing the 
strunp of Cordell Hull's avowed econot'1.ic internationalism, 
are as follows: 
Article I,, providing far the continua.nee ot free 
entry for all commodities produced in both e.ountr.iea, 
which were free of duty at the time of the signing of the 
treaty .. 
Article VI, lowering consular charges on documenta-
tion of shipments from five per cant of invoice value of 
shipment to two per cent. 
Article VIII, providing for the most-f'e,vored-nation 
tr.ea tme11t and prohi bf ting in tarnal taxes over and above 
the fixed maximum duty rates ... 
17.. nReciprocal Trade Agreement Be·tween the United States 
of .America and Cuba,n Executive ~eement Series, No. 
67, Washing-ton, 1934, pp. 1-m:J. · · 
UL nReciprocal '11ralle Agreement Between the United States 
and the Republic of Cuba," Trea.tz Informa. tion, Bul-
letin No .. 59, Washineton, 1934, p .. 8~ · 
29 
Article X, prohibiting the increasing ot' specific rates 
of duties as a result of .ourrency depreciation. 
The agreement was to be effective fo:r three years 
and thereafter unless abrogated by either coun'try upon 
·. . . 19 six months notice, 
Cuba's exports o:r sugar, tobacco, rum, and off season 
fruits and vegetables, eonrpr1sing ninety per cent of her 
exports t.o the United States, were given valuable conces-
sions. In return, Cuba granted tariff reductions at a 
corresponding rate to the United States. The most im-
portant exports of the United States ·t;o Cuba on which 
tariffs were reduced were lardt salt and smoked meats, 
vegetable oils, t.Jheat flour, rice, potatoes and onions, 
feedstuffs, and lumber; all agricultural products. In 
the fleld of manuf'a.etured products, Cuba granted tm.por-
ta.nt concessions and·reductio:µs on iron and. ste~l products, 
hardware, textile·s, automobil·es, rn.aehinery in general, 
and hundreds of other produets. 20 
Am.erioan products which entered Cuba ivere accorded 
reductions varying :from twenty to sixty per cent below 
those established for the same products of other countries. 
~'!Jle United States lik.ewise granted certain preferential 
21 :percentages to Cuban :products. Cuba's greatest exports 
l9o DJJ!· ' 
p .• 9. 
20. Ibid., p .. e. 
21. Berglund, ~- Cit., p. 420. -
to the United States we:t-e .sugar and. auga:r products, and 
the Un.i ted States reduced the duty on sugar im:por·ts from 
Cuba t.o nine-tenths cents per :pound from the former :rate 
"'2 of one and on$..:halt cents per :pound."" 
2. With Brazil. 
23 
30 
The agree.ment with Brazil was the second agreement 
concluded under the program of reciprocal t.rade agreements. 
It was. based upon tlle :principle o:r unconditional most-
favored-nation treatment. The agreement was composed of 
two schedules and the general provisions. Schedule I 
contained the conoes.sions ot Brazil to the United States 
and Schedule II listed the concessions granted Brazil by 
the Uni tad s·tates. 24 
Coffee eomposed eighty-five per cent of Brazil's ex-
ports to the United States. The United States guaranteed 
that coffee and other commodities, totalling ninety per 
cent of Brazil's exports to the Uni tea. States" would 
rem.-ain duty free; other duties were also reduced to a 
25 
certain extent. 
Brazil reduced. ha.r tariffs on a broad scale of 
22. I~id., p. 421~ 
2~.. ttReciprooal Trade Agreement and Supplementary Agree-
ment Between the United States of America and Brazil," 
Executive .agreement Series, l'Jo. 87, Washington, 1936, 
pp .. l-36. 
24. "Reciprocal. 1l1rade Agreement Between the United States 
and Brazil, 0 Treaty Inform.a tion, Bulletin No. 65 ,. 
Washington) 1934, p. 11. 
25. Berglund, .2P... .ill· , p.. 421. 
.American exports, including sixty-seven tariff elass1fi-
oations, and guaranteed ·tha t tariff' rates on thirty ... nine 
other elassifica.tions wouid not. be raised. The reductions 
extended from twenty to sixty seven per eent ot the rates 
in effect at the date the treaty was signed. The reduc-
tions covered thirty-two and one-half :per·cent and twenty-
three and eight-tenths per cent of Brazil"s imports fl;'o:m. 
the United States in the years 1929 and 1934. 26 
31 
The agreement with the Belgo-Lu:x:emburg E'.conom.ic Union27 
we.$ signed February 2'7, 1935, and was the third agreement 
concluded under Cordell Hull's trade :program. The agree-
ment was affected by a.,n exchange of notes between the t1..10 
parties. It contained two schedules.. Schedule I con-
tained Belgium's tariff r~d.uotions on the United States' 
exports, and Seh.edule II contained the United States' 
reciprocal reduetions on Belgium's exports. 
The United States made important ta.riff reduetiona 
to Belgium on four major types of products: (l} building 
materials- .... cement (six cents to four and one-ha.lf o.ents 
per 100 pounds),, :plate glass (fifty per oent. reduQti.on.s), 
,-
iron and steel products (fi:t'ty per eent}, and asbest.os 
shingles; (2J ma.n:u.tactured ite.ms---shotguns and parts,. 




t1Reciprooa.l Trade Agreerllent Between the United states 
and tbe Belgo-Luxemhurg Uni.on, n Executive :Yree.ment 
Series, No.. 67, Washington, 1935, pp 4 1-42 ~- -·· 
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parchment; (3) paints and chemicals--chalk, lead pigments, 
sodium phosphate, and aluminum sulphate; (4) food products--
grapes, endives, peas, and c hicory. 28 
Belgium made duty reductions on twenty-two import 
commodities from the United States, ranging from fifteen 
per cent to eighty per cent on manufactured arti cles, 
including automobile parts; and from t wenty per cent to 
fifty per cent on agricultural products such as oatmeal, 
lard, fruits, and linseed oil- cake. In all, Belgium 
gr anted concessions which affected export products of the 
United States valued at 16,000,000 in 1933. Belgian 
products which benefitted by Ameri can t ariff concessions 
were valued at $6,500,000 in 1934 . 
4, With Haiti. 29 
The reciprocal trade a greement between Haiti and the 
United States was the fifth concluded under the Trade 
.Agreements Act of June 12, 1934. It was signed at washing-
30 ton on March 26, 1935. The agreement provided for 
reciprocal rate reductions on important products of both 
28. '1Reciprocal Trade Agreement Between the United States 
of America and the Belgo-Luxemburg Eeonorui c Union, " 
Treaty Information, Bulletin No. 65, ~ashington, 
1935, p. 14 . 
29 . "Reciprocal Trade .Agreement Between the United States 
of America and Haiti, 11 Executive Agreement Series, 
No. 78, Washington, 1935, pp. 1-20. 
30. "Reciprocal Trade Agreement Between Haiti and the 
United States," Bulletin of~ ~-American Union, 
No. 7, Washington, 1935, p. 751. 
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countries, and for rec:Lprocal assurance o±' uncondi'tional 
raos t-favorecl-11.a tion trea t:m.ent of each other's corru:nercfJ in 
all respects, and guaranteed that no import quotas, inter-
nal taxes or other restrictions would impair the benefits 
31 
of the agreer!lent ., 
Coffee, cocoa beans, sisal fiber, logwood, bananas, 
and ginger root- ... all produced by Haiti and ex.por't8d to 
the United States--remainecl duty-free while reduction of· 
Arrterican duties on rum, fresh l)inea:pples, n1angoes, a:nd 
32 guava \'ms stipulated. · Hai ·ti reduced duties 011 tanned 
skins, seva:i,ng machines, tresh arid refrigerated beef, 
niut.ton, fresh and dried pork, Cannell i':cuits, ehees~, 
,) 
butter, preserved and malted milk, and seed potatoes. 
Hai ti also reducrnd her duties on lard, radios, automo'bile 
tires and tubes. These red.uc·tions were to be effective 
during those years when Hai ti's budget vH1s :pro:mulgated 
to the amount of 40,000,000 gourdes or more. 33 Haiti 
guaranteed not to increase her duties, during life of 
the agreement, on glass., iron and steel pi:pes and fi t;tings, 
a wide range of electrical machinery, automobiles, trucks, 




32. Ibid. 1 p .. 571. 
33. 11Reci:procal '.f'rade Agreement Between the United States 
and Hai ti , u Cownerce ,!::{el?prt s , No. 14 , Washington, 
April 6, 1935, p. 32. 
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rettes~ 
Haiti reduced her duties from one-fourth to two"" 
thirds of the duties of that time.. The product~ which 
w~re affected by the reduction had a total value of . . 
. . 35 
$623,000 in 1933. The principal concession or the 
United States guaranteed the continued free entry of the 
Haitian products> wl1ich amou.n'ced to $4'7? ,ooo, or fifty-
ni11e per cent o-f F;.&i ti's total exports in i935. 36 
5~ With Sweden. 37 
Tlie trade agreement between the. United Sta:tee and 
Sweden was signed on May- 25, 1935, and was the fifth to 
be eonsurr.mated under Cordell Hull's reciprocal trade 
a.gree:rrents program. American agrioul tural produots which 
benefited by Swedish tariff' reC.uctions were apples, .pears, 
grapefrUi t, and raisins, the latter two becoming duty 
tree. American manufacturing products which benef'fted·by 
sw-edish tariff reduetions were farm machinery, tr.actors, 
gasoline, automobiles, and canned items. 38 .. ~erioan ex-
ports to Sweden worth $15,000,000 received tariff 
34. nReoiproes.l Trade Agreement Between Haiti and the 
United States, 11 Bulle tiI_! of ~ Pan-American Union, 
No. 7 1 OJ?. c;i. t. , p. 572. 
34 
55. ttReci:procal Trade Jigreement Between the United states 
and Hai ti ,t' -Commerce Reports, No. 14, OJ?.. ill. , p. 232. 
36. Ibid. 
3? ~ uRe.ci:procal rrrade .Agreement Be'i;weon the United. states 
of America and sweden,n Executive 4.Sree~ent ser;i.es, 
No .. 79, Wa.shinston. 1935, p. 1. · · · 
!38. rto0-50 \Vi th Sweden/' Eusil-w ss Week, New York, J"Une l , 
1935, p. 34. 
35 
. 39 
ooncessions in this agreement. Sweden received a 
guarantee from the United States that rates would be re-· 
duced on wood-pulp, which constituted two-thirds of S?,eden, s 
exports to ·the United States .. 40 
6. With Colombia. 41 
The agreement between the United States and Colombia 
vma signed on September 13, 1):135. By this .agreement, the 
United States was assured tariff l."eductions ranging from 
sixteen to ninety per ¢~:nt on one hundred fifty classifiea.-
tions. These ~eduotions covered commodities compo.sing 
fifty-eight per cent of the Uni tecl Statestexports to 
Colombia in 1935. Colombia reduced her tariff on la.rd by 
fifty per cent. Other commodities of the United states 
which received :reductions, ranging fro:m twenty to seventy 
per cent, were processed .meats, fruits, vegetable.s, and 
42 t1ilkt lea,th~r, tobaceo end cigarettes. Passenger oar 
duties were reduced. twenty to twenty-five per cent~ Truok 
and bus duties were reduced fifty :pe:r cent. The duties on 
typewriters, cash registers, ancl adding machines, were 
reduced sixty-six and two-thirds per cent. 45 




Ibid., p. 34. 
naeciprocal 'l'l•ade Agreement Between. the United states 
of America and Colombia," Executive Agreement series, 
Washington, 1935, p. l. · · 
H~rring, 11Colomhia Trade Agreement, ,t current Hi~tory, 
l'lew York, Dee.ember, 1935 1 XLIII, p. 305,. 
Ibid. -
Coffee and crude petroleum constituted about ninety 
per cent of Colombia 's exports to the United States. 44 
Colombia was the world's second largest coffee producer, 
and the second largest source of coffee i mports of the 
45 
United States. The United States guaranteed trat these 
36 
two products, along with bananas, ipecac platinum, emeralds, 
tolu balsam, and other secondary products would remain duty-
46 
free. 
Eighty per cent of Colombia's imports from the 
United States were dutiable at t he time the agreement was 
signed, while ninety-four per cent of Colombia's exports 
to the United States remained on the free list. 47 secre-
tary Cordell Hull hoped the agreement would restore to 
the United States her export trade with Col ombia, which 
dwindled from $58 , 596,000 in 1928 down to ~10,670,000 in 
48 
1932, and rose to $21, 943,000 in 1934. 
7. With Canada. 49 
.An important forward step in the trade agreements 
44. r1Reciprocal Trade .Agreerent Between the United States 
and Colombia," Bulletin of the Pan-American Union, 











49. "Rectprocal Trade .Agreement Bet~een the United States 
of .America and the Dominion of Canada, n Executive 
.Agreement Series, no . 91, Washington, 1936, pp.1-30. 
program of the United St;ates, under the supervision of 
Cordell Rull, was reached v1hen the trade a.g.reem.ent with 
Canada was signed on November 15, 1935. The agreera.en t 
was importa...'1 t for two reo.son.s, one of which was that 
heretofore the agreements had been signed only with 
37 
minor countries. ?his step marked the entrance of the 
reciprocal trade agreements program into the major nati.ons 
of the wo;rJ.d.. The other reason for the importance of the 
agreement was that Canada is the United .states' second 
lurges t consumer~ Trade be t·ween the trm countries arftount.ed 
to 0,5 ,000 ,000 ,000 in 1934. The agreement affected commodi-
ties whieh com.p:ri.sed · over three--fou:rths the total dutiable 
exports trom the. United s·tates to C"tinada, and two-thirds 
. . . 50 
of the .total inrports of tlH~ Unl tea.. 2.tates from Ca...'llada • 
.American manufacturing products :received irnpressive 
tariff reductions. Am.Ong these were: automobiles and 
parts, duty cuts of eight per cent to twenty-five par 
cent; i.ron and steel products, eight per cent to twenty 
per cent; railway cars and parts, twelve and one-half 
pe.t cent; agricul ttiral implements, fifty per cent; electri-
cal apparatus, fifteen to twenty-five per eent; mining 
;machinery, nine per cent to fifty :per cent; textiles, 
twenty JH;U' cent; glass products, six per c0n·e to thirty 
50. E. L. Bacher, 11Signif'icance of the Trade .Agreemen-li 
Beti;veen the United States and Canada," World Trade, 
Paris, .January, 1936, 11. S. 
38 
51 
per cent; and. office eqUiJ)Illent, ten to twenty per cent. 
Canada granted tariff reduotions on seven hundred 
sixty-seven items in all, including wheat, fruit, meats, 
and eggs. One hund.rea. eighty were guaranteed against 
increase, and the remainder were granted most-favored-nation 
treatment, whereas before the agreement., they received 
only the benefit of the inter111ediate rates. The signifi-
cance of the concessions granted by Canada on seven hun ... 
dred sixty-seven United States items was ·the fact that 
one hundred fourteen of the items represented an export 
value of $500,000,000 in 1929-30. 52 
The United States guarrurl;eed that news-print• 11ulp ... 
wood, and vmod pulp vrnre to remain free of duty. These 
products represented ordinarily one-half of Canada's ex-
ports to the United States •. The whiskey tariff was re-
dueed fifty per cent. Whiskey importr.:; from Canad.a to t;he 
United .States totalled ~~16,000,000 in 1934. Canadian 
dairy and lumber :products r;vere benefited by tariff reduc-
tions but speeifi c quotas were sti:pula te<1 in this case. 53 
.America was guaranteec. most-favored-nation treatment 
except insofar as the British Empire VJas concerned. Canada 
was guaranteed :most-favored-nation treatment unconditionally 
51. nTrade on a New Basis,"·Business Week, New York, 
November 23, 1935, p. 8, 
52. Bacher, 212.. cit. , p. 4. 
53. nTrade on a New Basis,. n E.E_. ill· , p. S. 
. . 54 
by the United States. 
55 8. With Honduras. 
The Agreement between Honduras and the United states 
was signed December 18, 1935.· The agreement contained the 
uncondi tiona.l most-favored-nation clause and :provided for 
no increariH~ in tart ff rates which would annul the benefits 
of the reeiprocal taritf' advantages which the agreem.ent 
56 
had guaranteed. 
American agricultural products which benefited by 
Honduran reduet1on of import duties were: hamst shoulder, 
bacon, sausages, canned meats ( e;xce:pt salt and corned 
beet') , dried trui ts, .rolled oats, canned fruits, canned 
vegetables, sardines, canned salmon, butter, condensed 
5? and evaporated milk. Manufactured art.ic.les upon whi..0:h 
the Honduran irtlport duties were lowered were: cotton 
shirts, denim, soap, and :medicinal preparations. Honduran 
reductions on import duties of United St.ates products, 
ranged from. thirty-two per cent to seventy-five per cent 
39 
54. J. Bartlet Brebner, nThe Canadian Re<>iprocity Treaty," 
Current Hi.story, New York 1 January 1 1956, XLIII, 
408-409. 
55. "Reciprocal Trade Agreement Between the United state.s 
of' America and Honduras," Executive :A,Sreement series, 
~fol 86, Washington, lG36, pp. 1-~6. 
56. nHonduras", BulJ.etin o.f the Pan-American Union, t.lash-
ington, February, 1936, pp .. · "filSV-208 ~ 
57. 11Honduras and the United States Exchange Customs and 
Assurance~, n Commerce Reportsi Mo. 52, Washington·, 
1935, p. 4.64t 
of the duties e:f'fective prior to the agree.m.ent. The oom-
modi ties \'?hi eh received tha reduction ware valued at 
$411 1000 to United; States export trade in 1935. 58 
United States ag:rioul tural and industrial products 
which were bottnd against increased import duties by Hon-
duras we_re~ wheat flour, fresh fr-ui ts, dried whole milk, 
prepare·d breakfast foods, Ul,)per leathers, si,aet crackers, 
and biseuits. Passenger automobiles, t:ruoks, and bananas 
:remained duty free; cotton hose> hand tools tor artisans, 
jute, hemp, cotton bags, automobile tires: and tubes 1 
sawed timber, :planks,. boards, and many medicinal prepara-
59 tions remained free as well.· 
The principal concession of the United States to 
Honduras was t-he p:rom.ise of the continued unrestricted 
and duty-free entry of bananas, which represented nin.ety ... 
five :per cent -of Honduran exports to the United States. 
Other .Honduran product3 which were to continue duty-free 
were: coffee, plantains, coeoa beans, .sarsaparilla. root, 
and deerskins. Honduran pro due ·l;s upon which the United 
States lowered the tariff were: balsams, _pineapples, 
guava, and mangoes. These Honduran exports to the United 
States were va.lued at $?,505,000 in 1934. Ninet.y-nine 
per cent of the imports fr.om Honduras entered du.ty..-rree 
58. Ibid., p. 464. -
40 
60 
after the agreement was signed. 
9. With Ne therlands . 
This agreement was concluded and signed at Washing-
ton on December 20, 1935. It provided for unconditional 
most-favored-nation treatment in regard to custom duties, 
charges, and other regulations, hile national treatment 
was provided for internal taxes. 61 
41 
American products placed on the free list of Nether-
lands included: cotton, rosin, turpentine} borax, sulphur, 
rice, rolled oats and cereal breakfast foods, pine and 
fir, lubricating oil in bulk, lard , and stearine. Ameri-
can products which were tound against increase in duties 
were: apples, raisins, grapefruit, pear s, prunes, canned 
goods, salted horse meat, refrigerators and parts, office 
appliances, automobiles, automotive accessories, trucks, 
tractors, and various parts of these. The Netherlands 
reduced its "monopoly fee s" one-half on .American fruits 
and various canned goods . The Netherlands also gave im-
portant quota concessions on many ty-pes of steel and 
textile products. 62 The Netherlands agreed to buy wheat 
and wheat flour in annual quanti ties , subject to price 
conditions and conswnptton requirement·s, from the 
60. Ibid., p. 464 . 
61. "Reciprocal Trade Agreement Between Netherlands 
Signed,n Commerce Reports, Washington, December 28, 
1935 , p. 464. 
62 .. Ibid. -
53 United States .. ·· 
42 
In return for ·th0 above concessions, ·the Uni tad StateS: 
placed on its free list twenty-two .m.ajox export produc'ts 
of the Netherlands, and reduced rates on forty-one other 
items which were not seriously compe'ti 'ti ve to A.meri can 
d ti d t . 64 om.es· c pro ue 10:n. 
10. Vii th Swi tzerla:nd .. 66 
The a,greement between the United States and Switz-
erland was signed e.t Washington on January 9, 1936., In 
addition to the general :provisions of unoonditione.l most-
favored-nation treatment by both countries. it eontained 
provi.sions for reciprocal du·ty reductions and more liberal 
66 quota eoneessions for the United States.· 
Switzerland reduced her duty rates on many American 
products, including: lard, chewing gum, sardines, fruits 
(oanned}, apriQots, prunes, dried plums, wallboard of 
· .. vegetable :era terial, typewriters, cash registers, a.ocoU;nt.ing 
:machines, calculating ma.chines~ and oil-burners weighing 
-- under 500 kilos each. 137 Switzerland guaranteed no 
63. Ibid., p. 464. -
64~ Ibid., P• 464. 
65. "Reeiprocal Trade Agreement Be·t\veen the United States 
of Am.erica and Switzerla.nd,u Executive ,M:t:>eement 
,S~ries, No. 90 , Washington, 1936, · p. 1. . · · 
66. uReciprocal Trade Agreement Between the Uni tea States 
a,nd Switzerland, n Oommer_<}._e Reports, Washi,ng ton, Janu.-
arty 18, 19 36 , p •. 55 . 
67.. lbid. 
increase of duty.rates would be lliade on the following 
articles: rice, ri::1.isins, kid lea·ther, Douglas i'ir lwnber, 
raw oo·tton, tires and '.tubes, si 11osie:cy, en1ery powder, 
ca:elmru:ndw:n, sausage casings, ca.nned c.sparagus, elect:r:ic 
retrigerators, auton;,obi1es ,, coal tar, bookbimling :machinery, 
type-se tti:rtg 1:aachines, aniline dyes} para.i'fin and ceresin, 
petrolatum and lubricating greases. 68 
Switzerland also raised her import quotas on JUne.rica:n 
p.roclucts \vhich include::d v:iheat, rice, dried and f'resll fruits, 
cirnned vegetables.~ lm1ber, vmllbe,ards of vegetable fiber, 
' . 
silk hosiery, pe trclEmrn produc t:3, gasoline, kerosene, 
. t . d t l ;i 1 t · "" · · t · 69 automolliles, ires au u Je,s, a:nu .. e ec r:i.c re,4.rigera ors. 
These dt1ty ooneessions by Switzerland affected products 
which represented a.bout sixty per cent of her imports 
from the United States. 11he Swiss govermnent depended 
upon custom. receipts for about seventy :pe1~ cent· of its 
reve:nue. 70 
The United States reduced its imJ;,,ort duties on S1.,vitz-
erland' s products \'.lhich :i_ncluded certain chem.iouls, coal-
tar dyes, ,na t.ch m.ove:ments 1 Erurt1enthaler and Gruyere cheeses, 
cotton cloths, silks, machine-embroidered fabrics, knit 
underwear. testing macJ:1ines, straw ha 'cs, lJILrnic boxes, and 








p. 55. ____,_. 
in Am.erican im.por'ts froi:n S1i:d tzerland in 19~14, an.d se·venty-
one per cent of the total 1u11erica11 i:m.:por'ts from Switzer-
?l land. 
The trade Agreement between the United States and 
liica1·agua was signed in Washington on September 1, 
It provided for uncond.itio11al most-favored-nation ·treat-
ment ot eo1un1erce between the t·wo nations. It prohibited 
a:ny new increase of import tax or charge on the products 
listed in the schedules, with the excep·tion of dumping 
duties and special charges whose imposition was by lavJS · 
extant at the tin1e of s:i..gntng the agreen1ent. 
IUcaragua granted tariff reductions 011 :nine tariff 
items, and assurance was given against increase of duty 
on fifteen~ The product.s on which the tariff ,;,1lis reduced 
by Nicaragua 11vere: lard, dried ivhole and dr:led sk.inn:ned 
milk, canned and dried fruits, rubber heels, canned vege·-
tables, :medical preparations, varnishes, and mixed paints. 
'fhe IJrod.ucts on 17;hicll :Nicaragua promised no rate increase 
were: wheat flour, indur1t.rial machinery, electrical 
'71. ~., p. 55. 
72. "Heciproeal Trade AgreenYa:nt Between the United Ste.tes 
a11d Nl.co.1'af9,1a j n ExecutJtr~ ~r§eme,nt ~' Mo. 95 i 
Ht:,shington, 1936, p:p. 1-24. 
44 
13. nneciprooal T·:rade J).8:t'eement Between Iticaragua and the 
United ~3tates l)ronmlgated, 11 Bulletin of the Pan-M1eri-, 
.<?2.t1 Union, Washington, October, 1936, p, 809.- -
electrical equipm.en-t ~ auto1,1obiles: tires tubes, upper 
leather) dried beeu1s, cotton hosiery, and specified medi-
cinal preparattons and groprie-t;ary medicine.s. 74 
The United Btates grari'l;ed. to Nicaragua tariff reduc-
tions of fifty per con't on Peru balso.r.a. and prorcLisect ·the.t; 
the following products would continue on the free list 
dtu·ing the course of ·the agreement: coffee, cocoa he ans, 
bananas, c:cude ipecac, sneJces and other reptile skins, 
45 
logwood, deerskins, and turtles. se products represented 
over ninety rer cen't of Nicaraguan exports to the United 
?5 
States durin(~ the years 1932, 1933r and 1934. 
1 ° -·t1· G t ··· 1 76 _.::,, wi · 1 .zua ,oma~a.. 
This trade agreement waE, signed in temala City on 
.April 24, 1936, by re}Jresenta'ti ves of Guatemala and the 
United States. I-t; was the seventh agreem0nt v1hich the 
Uni s tes had concluded ·with Latin AJ:1erican states.?? 
Guatemalats n1ost important irnports fron1 thr:J United 
States had been t; flour~ lo.rd, raw.cotton, cotto1:i 
yarn, cotton cloth, leather, automobiles~ tires, tubes, 
-·----------
?4. ~., p. 80'1L 
Jbid. , p. 809. 
76" "Heci:procn1 Trade Agreement Between the United States 
of Arn.erica and Guatemala,1t Exe9:u~.i.Y.~ AfireeE1el1'!!_ Series, 
No. 92, Washington, 1936, pp. 1-25. 
?? . H 1I1ariff Agreement Between the United States and Guate-
mala," Bulletin of the Pan-.lll'n.erican Union, Washington) 
J'uly, 1936, p. 586.- - · · --
pariffin, petroleum products, 1uachinery, iron and steel 
products, radios, paint and varnishes, and medicinal prep-
ara:tions. 78 Sl1e reduced her tariffs from twenty-five to 
fi:f'ty per cent of the duties in effect. Guatemala also 
:provided that no duties ws)Uld be increased on ma11y other 
.Arnerica.11 products. The United States had in the past bought 
about one-third of Guatemalan exports and supplied a.bout 
one-half of l ts im,ports. 79 
Both countries further agreed not to impair the 
benefits of the agreement through import quotas, increc'J.se 
of internal taxes, and exchange control discriminations. 
Likewise, the agreement contained a reciprocal general 
.assurance of' u:ncondi tiona.l n:i.ost-favored-nation treatment 
of each other's comme.rce. BO 
13. Vii th France. 
The agreement between the United States and France 
was diff'ere11t from the rest of the trade agreements 
under the program o.f' Cordell Hull because i·t was signed 
in Washington, May 6, 1936, and ws.s to be effective until 
July 1, 193?, and thereaf't.er indef'ini tely unt;il e1 ther 
country gave six .months notice of desire to withdra,n from 
the agreement. It 'tl!Jas the thirteenth agreement concluded 
Y/8. Ibid. , p. 58?. 
79, Ibid., p. 586, 
80. ~., p. 586, 
by the United States. It contained the gua1'"antee of un-
conditional mos·t-favored-na tion clause, with certain 
j.,'. 81 exce:p -.,1 ons • 
American products which vier·e placed on the r.1inirm;uT1 
:rates of duty by France were: rice, refrigerating appara-
tus, nUll1erous other types of xnachinery, lea~1,her footvfear, 
tires and tubes, other rubber rD.anufactQres, certain kinds 
of' paper, insulating boa:rd and well board, many ohem11cals 
and textiles, and pharmaceutical specialties. certain 
products which received mini:aru.m ra:tes and a quota ivere: 
sardines, borax, sodium, potassium chromates, and bichro-
82 
mates~ France reduced her rates on automobiles, grape-
fruit, dried pru11es, ra.i sins, canned asparagus a.nd :pine-
apple, sewing machinesI cash registers, spark plugs, foun-
tain pens, and a.utori1ati.o pene1ls. 83 France gave quota 
4/7 
.concessions to the United States which included fresh 
a:pples and :pears, oranges, ea.:nned salmon, logs and lumber, 
electric refrigera:tors, radios and radio tubes, typewri tars 
and par·ts, pa,tent leather, IJassenger automobiles, ·tires, 
tubes, and certain abrasives, and silk hosiery. 84 
Tl1e United States reduce(l duties on fifty tariff 
61. t1Rec:t1n:ocal rrrade iigree.ment Between ]'ranee and the 
United States, 11 Cmmuerce Reports> Washington, May 23, 
1936, pp. 403-411. 
a2 • Ini a. , p • 4o 3 , 
83.. Ibid., p. 40!3. 
~ 
84. Ibid~, p. 410. 
paragraphs. The 11':rench products vihi ch :benefited by these 
:r:•eductions included: ;perfumes and essential oils, broad 
silks, vmven fabrics of rayon, tinsel 11roducts, cotton 
lace corsets, gloves, cigarette papers, brandy 1 cordials, 
and liquors, charnJ])agnes 1:1nd other wines, still wines up 
to fourteen per cent alcohol, cheese, canned mushrooms, 
. . . . 85 and 1na:caschino c.nEn'r1as. 
'.l1he United St~ites and Finland signed a reciprocal 
trade agreer11ent at '\hashing ton on May 18, 1936. Reciprocal 
concessions and assurances on selected articles of :partic-
ular b1:portancG in the trade of the two cou11tries were 
:provided for in the agreenwnt. As a previous treaty 
between the tvao countries guaranteeing mos·t-favorec1-ne.tion 
treatment was already in effect, ·this agreement did not 
s:pe ci fie ally outline 'that stipulation. 
Finland reduced. her duties on A:merican raisins fifty 
per cent; 011 apples, a bout seventy per cent; on lard, 
sixty per cent; on grapefruit, fifty per cent; on dried 
:pee.rs, apricots, peaches, and mixed f.rui t for salacl, .fifty 
8? pe:r cent; 011 canned fruits, thirty per cent. J.!"inland 
86. u.aecip.rocal Trade Agreement Between ·the United states 
of . AJ..nerice. a_nd Finland, n Exem.tti ve ASreement series, 
No. 97, 1;:Jashi:n.gton, l'l:136, p. 1~ 
87. n11eciprocal 'I'rade Agreement Be'tween the United states 
and ::lI'inla:nd Signed, n Oo.:mr1erce R,!3J20rt!?., vvashi:n.gton, 
:May 30, 1936 1 P~ 433. . 
48 
49 
reaueed her duties on automobile tires and tubes by ten 
per cent ; on steel de sk:s and chairs for of'fice use, thirty 
per cent~ She bound a.gains t incn,·-ease ·the following arti-
cles of importance: cornstarch, patent leather, jute 
sacks, gasoline, c.opper rods, rubber belts, mot.ion-picture 
machines, ot':f'ice machi11e s, and most auto:mob1les e.nd their 
88 
parts. The tarif;t' concessions made by Finland applied 
to articles which in 1934 were imported. front the TJnited 
S,'9 
States and ba·d a total: value of $5,546,647. · 
88. Ibid., p. 4:33. 
89. Ibid., p. 455. 
CH.APT1.J:R III 
RESULTS 0]' CORDELL HIJLL' S RECIPROCAL 
TR.ADE AGBEEME~"TS :PROGRP .. M 
By March, 1937, the trade agreements program b.ad been 
in effect a suffic.1e11t length or time to determin~ its 
relative value to the trade recovery of the United s·ta.tes. 
The evidence of the stimulus which th.e agreements afforded 
to foreign trade was provided by the official returns of 
the United States r foreign trade during 1936. By compar-
ing the figures of foretgn trade during 1934 and 19!35 with 
those of li56, the conclusion was reached that the trade 
50 
of the United State.a r.Jith each country with whioh an agree-
ment had been concluded showed a greater in.crease than 
the trade of the United States with countries which had 
.not negotiated such agreements. 1 
U:nited States exports to trade-agreements countries 
showed an increase of fourteen per cent, while er.i)orts 
to non-agreement countries shmaed an increase of only four 
per cent in 1936. Likewise, the United States imported 
twenty-two :per cent more from trade-agree:mcmts countries 
in 1935 than in 1935, rmile inrports from non-agreements 
countries showed an increase of only sixteen per cent 
over 1935. 2 The agreements with Cuba, Belgiu..'11, Canada, 
l. 11Summary of the United States 11"rade with World, 1936,," 
Trad.e Informatio~ .Bulletin, No. 837, Washington, 1937 • 
v· 3. 
2. Ibid .. 
and Sweden had been concluded a sufficient period of time 
to afford well-nigh incontestable evidence of the suc-cess 
of the Tra:de Agreements Program which Cordell Hull had 
steadily nuain·tained would bring about a rejuvenation of 
the United Ste.tee' foreign trade. 
The objective of the trade agreements px·ogram was the 
promotion of foreign trade, which :rnea.'1 t an increase of 
imports as well as expol"t;s, and 1 ·t was based upon the 
3 principle that trade i.s a two-way process.· Since that 
51 
was the goal toward. which the rocip:rocal trade agreements 
program was directed, a survey of the results of the agree-
ments with Cuba, Belgium, Ca.."la.da, and Sweden, Hai ti, and 
Brazil,. all of whi c.h went in to effect before or bir Janu-
a:ry 1, 1936, would provide undeniable evidence that the 
:program had been definitely successful. 
In studying the results of the reeiproeal trade 
agreements between tl1e U11i 'ted States and Cuba, the tol1ow-
111g figures were disclosed: (1) In 1934, tb.e United 
States exported t,o Cube products valued at $45,323,000; 
in 1935 i one year after the agreement was concluded, the 
United Sta:tes exported to Cuba products valued at 
$60,139,000; and in 1936, tbe United. States expor·ted to 
Cuba corn.m.odi ties valued at ~~67 ,452 ,000, an increase o.f 
forty-eight and eight-tenths per cent over 1955. (2) In 
J - "M>.iii.; •-·-·-------------------------
5.. ]'ranc is B. Sayre and George N. Peek., '' JJJ:e the Trade 
,.1i.greements Beneficial?", Clttistian Science Monitor, 
Boston 1 October 2£5, 1936, p. 1~ ·· - -
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1934, Cuba e:,rported to the United States products valued. 
at i~78,929,000; in 1935, she ex:porte:d to the United States 
products valued at $104,303,000; and in 1936, Cuba ex-
ported to the United States products valued at $127,48'7,000, 
an increase of sixt;y-one and one-half per cent over 1934, 
and twenty-two and one-half :per cent over 1~35.4 A sub-
stantial part of the rise in value of the United States 
imports from Cuba v1a.s due to the advance in sugar :prioea., 5 
.(3) ]'rancis B. Sayre, assista:n·c Secreta:t"'Y of' st.ate, stat;ed 
that alnost tlle entire quota for Cuban sugar cane ca1ue 
into the United States during the first four months o:f' the 
trade a.greeme.nt and ·that all the quota. for 1955 came in 
duri1-:ig the first eight months of 1935. This fact 
accounted for Cub8.' s exports. of sugar valued at ~~96 ,ooo ,000 
in the first year of the agreement (September, 1934, to 
Septe1n.ber • 1935) .. 0 Say:t."e further pointed out that the 
American f'armer did 11ot suffer as a result of the Cuban 
export ad.vantage, because Alllerican agricm.l tural irnports 
from Cuba other than sugar inc1"eased only ~~l, 600,000 
during the first year of the agreement, and .American agri-
cultural exports to Cuba during the sane period increased 
4. nsm.11Ii1ary of the United States Trade wi t.r1 world ,rt 
Tra~ Information Bulletin, op. cit., p. 38. 
p. ]_bid., p. 17. 
6. Say.re and Peek, ?P· cit., p. 3. 
53 
f1'o:m ~µ6 ,eoo ,ooo to !;i\14, 900, ooo 1:n 1935. 7 In conclusion 
ot t11e agreement with Cuba,· tro.dc was stimulated appreciably 
both in expol"'ts and imports. 
A survey of the results of the trade agreement with 
Belgium showed the following figures: (1) in 1935, the 
United States expo.rted to Belgium products valued a·t 
1~58,304,000; in 1936, the United States exported to Bel-
giu.,.u. products valued at $58, 78? ,000, an increase of 
elght-ten·ths of one pe:r cent. ( 2} In 1935, Belgium 
exported products valued at ~139 ,805 ,000 to the United 
States; in 1036, one year after the agreement was concluded, 
Belgium er.Ported to the United States products valued at 
$58,882,000, an increase of forty--scven and .nin0-t:enths 
per eent. 8 Shipments of lumber, fuel oil, and steel 
mauufactu:res of the United States to Belgium increased in 
1936, while shipments of ra:w cotton, food;:;tuf'fs, and auto-
9 
:mobiles were decreaserl.. Sayre st3.ted, in October, l935t 
that .American exports to Belgium increased tir1enty-tbree 
and five-tenths :per cent in the first year of the agree-
ment, and that Belgiur.1's exports to the United States 
increased I'ifty-eight per cent during the same period; 
but that $4,372 ~000 of the increase of ir:11ports from Belgium 
7. Ibid., :p. 3. 
a. 11 Summary of the United States Trade with world, 1i 
Trade In.formation Bulletin, op .. cit., p. 3. 
9. Ibid., p. 13. 
was 111 no:n-competi ti ve articles such as dis.mends and 
th ti 1 rl • A i • d t • 10 0 · · er ar . C ·. es use,..1. in ,uner· C-a.11 lllr US l'10S .. Cordell 
Hull sa.i,d that domestic prosperity depended upon increased 
imports as well as increased exports, 11 a fact ivhich was 
a justification ot the agreement with Belgium whe.rein the 
United States increased its exports to Belgium only e1ght-
teuths o:f one per cont in 1936 over that; of 1935, whereas 
Belgium in.creased her exports to tho United States forty ... 
seven and rdne-tenths per cent during the same period. 
Geor'.ge l'ir. :Peek severely cri tioized the trade ag:ree-
me:r1,ts b.ec.ause he thought that the United States 1.'lJaS giving 
away he.r ri.ch .t...m.erican markets in return to:i.: a promise of 
l"JO:Cld peace. He pointed out asreementn like tha:t with 
12 Belgium as a:xamples to .sup;port his sta:terueni,s. 
The reciprocal trade agreemen·t with Canada probably 
gave an insight into the results of the trade ag:reemen ts 
better than the others because. it was the United Sta:tes' 
\ second largest costomer. In 1936, the first year of the 
)\ 
trade under the tams of the agree.w.ent with Canada, the 
United States exports to that country increased nineteen 
per cent in value. The total value of the United States 
export :products equalled ~~383 ,953 ,000 in 1956, as 
10. Sayre and Peek, oii. cit .. , p. 3. 
~ --
11. Francis B. Sayre, nrncreased Exports with a Diminish-
ing Export J3al&nce an Omen of Sound Recovery, 0 
Oommercio.l Policy Series} No. 19, Washington, 1935, 
p., 3. 
12. Sayre and Peek, ~· c:i. t., p. 3. 
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compared to a total value of J323 ,194,190 in 1935. 13 
Exports increased in all classes of commodities: finished 
manufactures increased twenty-eight per cent; semi-manu-
factures increased thirteen per cent; food-stuffs increased 
twenty-four per cent; and crude materials increased ten 
per cent, as compared with 1935. 14 
The United States' i1aports from Canada increased 
thirty-one per cent over that of 1935. :r.rore wheat was 
imported because of the drought in 1936. The various 
classes of imports increased from t elve to sixty per cent, 
also • .Among these classes were meat products , whiskey , 
asbestos, lwnber, newsprint, and cheese. 15 
The trade agreements discussed above have indicated 
suf:ficiently t he effectiveness of the Cordell Hull Trade 
Program in increasing t he foreign trade of the United 
States. The agreements may or may not have had an appre-
ciable influence in increasing the trade of the United 
States with both agreement and non-agreement countries. 
It was an official fact , nevertheless, that the trade 
of t he United States did show an increase in 1935 over 
that of 1934, the year in which the trade agreements 
p~ogram moved into action. 
13. nsu.mmary of the United States Tr ade with World,n 
Trade Information Bulletin,~· cit., p. 38. 
14. 1.lli· , p. 14. 
15 . ~., p. 17. 
The e::x:tent to which the United states foreign trade 
increased. in 1936 was officially designated as follows: 
the value of the United States total e:rcpo:rts was eight 
pe.r eent larger than in 1935; and the value of the United 
States total imports was eight0en per cont larger them in 
1935. 16 Tne trade in dollars was as follows: exports, 
(~2,453,000tOOO; imports, ~~2,41~ ,000,000; with a net 
balance of .merclla.ndise exports of ~;34.,258,000. 117 
The net balanee of merchandise exports was smaller 
than was eonsidered satisfactory by some interested 
parties, but Sayre made a very si&"llifioant and informative 
statement in regard to that consideration in which he 
said that 
fJhether a country's foreign ·trade should show an 
excess of imports or exports, and the appropriate 
amount of' the excess, should be governed in the 
long run by the state of' the nation's lon.g-term 
indebtedness or credits and by the services which 
it renders to at.her nations •.. generally speak-
ing, a creditor na.ti on should show an excess of 
imports. 0 18 
Debtor na tiono to the United Ste_tes could pay their 
debts only ::i.n goods and services, so the increased imports 
rep;resented a partial pay:mont of debts to the United . 
States. .Furthermore, :m:ost of the imports were of suoh 
com.modi ties as coffee, r·ubber, and sillt:, whieh were not 
16. Ibid., p. 17. -
1.7. Ibiq_., :P• 1. 
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18. ]'ra.neis B. Sayre, u111crea.sed Kr:por'.ts with a Diminish-
ing Erport Balance, n Co!ll.tlercial ;fol_ioy series, No. 19, 
.2.12.. oi.t. , p •. 3. · 
competitive with domestic produc·tion; over half the 
no.r1aal agricultural imports of the United States were 11ot 
. . . 19 directly eonpet1t1ve. 
Peek contended that the increased impor·ts of' wheat, 
grains, food-stuffs, and cuttle, and the decreased exports 
of cotton, wheat, and :pork products, princi_ps.l export 
crops of the United States, 1~.ie2..nt that the United states 
was no longer :f'eeding or clothing itself but~ by the 
lowering of tariffs in the x·eciprocal t:rado agreements, 
was taking the J\merican fa.rL.1Brs out ,of foreign 1i1arke·ts 
and putting fore:'lgn farm.ers in .Arr.1.0rican llmrkets. 20 
Cordell Hull co1Tu1:1en ted upon the increased imports 
as being due chiefly to enlarged Arne:z.,ica:n demand for :raw 
materials as a result of ir11proved productive acttvi ty and 
incrEJased purchasing power of the United States. 21 
Ernest :-JI •. Patterson stated t;hat the general rise in 
business activity offset tlla losses duo to the increased 
..,2 
imports of conrpeti ti ve goods • ..., 
A conclusive statement as to the result;s of' Cordell 
Hull ts Reciprocal Trade Agreem1;mts Program is ·t;hat it \'!las 
10. Sayre and Peek, 2:E.. .=ll. , p.. 5. 
20. Ibid •• p. 3. 
21. Coro.ell Hull, 11our Foreign Relations and Our Jroreign 
Policy," C0Iil\.11ercial Policl Series, 1Jfash1ngton 1 1936, 
P• 5. . 
5'7 
22. Ernest Minor Patterson, n:aoosevelt: An Ame:r;-ican View," 
~ Co1,1. temporary Reviev1, London, January, 1.937. 
successfttl in increasing th0 foreign trade of' tlle United 
States. Authority for such a conclusion ·was contai:ne.d in 
the report of the Department of Commerce for 1936, which 
showed that the foreign trade of the United s·tates in 1935 
l1'Jas eigh·t per cent less in exports and eighteen per cent 
less in imports than in 1936. 
'fhe report likewise .showed that ei~ports and imports 
trade with trade agreement countries increased fourteen 
and twenty-two pe_r cent, respectively> 11\Jhile the exports 
and imports trade with non-agreement countries increased 
four and sixteen per cent, respectively. The increases 
were for the year from 1935 to 1935. The data shown here 
has been previously used in showing the results, and is 
re-presented for smlli'!lary purposes. 
George N. Peek, former Special Adviser to the Presi-
dent on Foreign Trade, was the most caustic and inveterate 
critic of' Cordell Hull's trade program. He may have been 
slightly :prejudiced against the program because of hi$ 
defeet in a political battle with Cordell R'ull for the 
leadership of the reoi:procm.l tracte agreements program. 
Nevertheless, his criticisms were vital and based upon 
careful study and brilliant logic. 
He said that the outstanding cause of tl1e depression 
we.a due to the disparity between tho agricultur(!l.l income 
and industrial income of the United States, which vms 
characterized by the decline of farm purchasing power in 
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the ni:neteen-twenties its final collapse; when tl:te 
farm pure sing :potver collapsed, the;:; national pros1'.Jer.ity 
co1la1;sed with it. 'l'ha foreign trade policy should ha,,e 
b$en directed wholly toward rectifying tl1B:t disparity be-
,t;ween farm 0.nd industrial income, but it was not, he said. 
'l'he reciprocal ·trade ag:eeem.ent s program had increased tlHa't 
di spar:i. ty, and i'o:r this recrnon it ,aaE, n failure, he felt;. 24 
lie did not believe that the world trade barriers so 
prevalen:t after the depres;::Jion were due to the enc1ctment 
of the Smoot-Hawl0y act;, as Cordell Hull did, but tlu1·~ 
they vHu·e a result of changed :nornal channels of trade, 
defunct national rn.oney system used in international trade) 
and of tho increased })arti ci:pation of govern.men t;s in 
de~e:rm.ining trade policies. The effect of Cordell Hull's 
prograu1 vwuld. be the re-opening of tho United States. and 
the iu11erioas to econoL1.i0, and perhaps political, colo:ni-
7,G,'tion by 0th.ex· nations. ~3uch a rcieul t ViOUld. occur frcm 
Cordell Hull's practice of giving Jui1erice.'s markets ·to 
bellige1"'ent· i'oreig:n nations, a s a bribe for ·world peace. 25 
He further contended that Congress was duped into 
thinking they were passine; an act delegating t;he power to 
moJrn trade, viherear; they t:1ere delegating :power to revise 
_...,..... ___________________ , ___ __.... 
2. i'.?. v .. 
25. Ibid .. p. 3. _._.... « 
tariff rates downward fifty per cent; and that the act was 
passed primarily to dispose of agricultural surpluses and 
60 
to help do~estic unemployment, but that the State Department 
fastened the act to a program of world peace, and in seek-
ing to strike doTin the tariff barriers of the world, only 
succeeded in striking down those of tho United States. 26 
He indicted the State Departmnt, under Cordell Hull, for 
taking control of the trade agreement negotiations and for 
discarding the other machinery pr ovided for such purpose, 
whi ch included t 1e Cammi ttee for 1 eciproci t y In:t'orma tion, 
and the Executive Committee on Commercial Policy. The 
hearings were a farce; no interested parties, except the 
officials, knew what \,as b·,ing done, had been done, or 
what ;as intended to be done by the government. The briefs 
of individuals who v.rere highly concerned with a proposed 
agreement received little attention, an in the case of 
Cuba, the agreement was practically concluded when it 
was held up so that a gesture of a hearing could be con-
cluded.27 
He branded the officials in charge of negotiating 
the agreements as a whole, as impractical professors, and 
stated that in revising the tariff rates, the experts 
simply picked out the imports which amounted to less than 
26. Samuel Crowther and George N. Peek, 11 In and Out Trade 
Agreements and Disagreements," Saturday Evening Pos t , 
Philadelphia, June 13, 1936, p . 23. 
27. Ibid., p. 80-81. 
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ten }?er cent of the domestic consumption, and lowered. the 
tariff. The textbook-: they em.ployed v1as the Eoonomie J\naly-
si s of the Foreign Trade of the United States in Relation 
to the Tariff, whicll ·was submi ttecl by the Ta.riff CoITJmission 
in 1933. 28 
I11 ref0r('.l:nc0 to the unconditional most-favored-natio.n 
trea:tJJJent em.ployed in a. Il1;J.jori ty of the agreements, he 
felt that it 'JJEls 01rong, because although they were con-
ceded only to the nprincj_pal-suppliers,n other nations 
could become 0 :prin.cipal-suppliers 11 also and enjoy ·!;he 
tarif'f concessions of ·the United states. Fu:J?thermore, 
the unconditional m.ost-favored-nation treatment was not 
a tradi·tional :policy of the United States, but had been 
29 adopted. as la·te as 1922. In suppo:i~t of ·this denuncia-
tion, he ci tcd mu.ong others, the concessions made to 
Brazi 1 on mangane se , of which material the Russi em ne:t ion 
<2Q 
is also as great a producer as Brazil.v Finally, he 
stat0d that, no·t United States was triangular but ·that 
payrnents were triangular; that 11 binding on the free list 11 
was fatal to good 'trad.ing.31 
1rrank A .. Southard) Jr. v1as one of t,he most ardent 
supporters of tl1e reciprocal trade agreernents program. 
28 • ill.£. ' :p. 02 9 
29. }) • 82. 
30. ]bid., p, 83. 
He wrote many articles :praising and defending the 1n•ogrrun .. 
Re answered many of those criticisms of' the p.rogram which 
he felt most destructive 'to the program. 
In answer to crit:icisms that the hearings had been 
"perfunctoryn; that there WES 11no reason to believe that 
the officials even looked a ·t the testimonyn; that nnone of: 
the agreements disclosed the slightest in·terest in the 
welfare of' the United Statesn; and tl1at. the officials 
responsible for thG program were inexperienced and un-
representative; he replied that to his personal knowledge 1 
all da·ta, letters, and eonsidei·ations pertaining to the 
trade agreements hearings \i/ere given thorough 9 tudy a.nd 
considera:tion by the officials.. He stated. that the inter--
departmental committee zrerabers were widely expe~ienced 
economists, thirty 01' whom had studied as graduates in 
foreign and native universities, taught in colleges and 
universities, served on staffs of pri va·te and })Ubl.ic :re-
search organizations, and had had practical ex-parience. in 
thirty separate fields of coraraerce, industry, and fin.a.nee. 
Re eited a tremendous list of their qualifications and 
aecomplishments to prove the capabilities of the officials 
responsible for the trade agreement negotiations. 32 He 
did not show the effects of the reciprocal trade agree-
ments :p:rogram, but did point out that .in the year follow-
32. Frank A. Southard, ;fr. , n America St9lf-Contained? 11 , 
7oru:m, Concord,. New Hampshire, Jrngust, 1935, XCVI, 
78-79. 
ing the agreement with Cuba, the United States expo r·ts to 
Cuba inc reased fifty per cent in quantity. 33 
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A criticism which was widely prevalent was voiced by 
George Soule, when he said that the foreign trade was a 
small factor in the United States' total business. 34 
Southard answered that criticism when he said that approxi-
mately 5,000,000 people normally depended upon f oreign 
trade for their employment, and he asked if nny business 
in the United States was so prosperous that a ten per cent 
increase in business was so trivial as to be ignored. Ten 
per cent represented the amount whi ch forei gn trade com-
pos ed of the total domestic production of the United 
s·tates. 35 
Francis B. Sayre, as Assistant Secretary of state, 
was probably the man in the government charged with the 
defense of the reciprocal trade agreements program. He 
Virote many articles and made speeches supporting the pro-
gram and defending it against its critics. 
First, he felt tha t the objective of the program was 
the promotion of foreign trade, which meant the increase 
of both exports nnd imports, and that trade is a two-way 
process. For that r eason, he said, the Administration's 
efforts were directed toward a liberalization of trade on 
33. ~-, p. 79. 
34. George Soule, nThi s Recovery," Harl?ers, New York, 
March, 1937, p. 341. 
35. Southard, .212.· cit., p . ?5. 
a broad and reoiprocal basis re.ther than stimu.la.ti on of 
erports by artificial means. Although trade might be 
s.timula ted by shrewd "horse trades," the resul ta of such 
64 
a program would be the breakdown of co-ope~at1ve effort, 
inereased hostility and retaliation, and heightened barriers 
with a :rurther strangulation of' international con1m.erce. 36 
America could fully reoover only through world re-
covery, he said, and that was the reason the United state.s 
must throw its influence against the network of trade 
barriers the world over. 37 '.Phat ideal found expression, 
he thought, in the unconditional most-favored-nation 
treatment whioh was stipulated in most of the reciprocal 
trade agreements. such treatment was a. traditional 
American policy and had been woven into treaties and 
t · th t · f o· "' h · + 38 agreem.e n . s s:i.nce e . 1:me o eorge trias 1ng ~on. 
As preferenti.al 'bargaining led to conflict, so the 
system o-r equal treatment, based upon justn()ss and fair-
ness, would make .for stable economic relations- and \'Jorld 
peace, he said. The United States i,ould profit through 
that policy beo.auae her trade was strikingly triangular, 
.As a. final contention"" he stated that the :program was 
helping to restore to Americ,an agriculture and industry 
the foreign markets which they had lost after 1930; t"l1at 
~o.. Sayre and Peek, 21?.. cit. , l)P. 1-2. 
37. lli2.-., p. 2. 
38. Ibid'* ,pp. 2-3. 
the inereased. imports were cause f'or rejoicing, bees.use 
the United States \ms enjoying 1 ts position as .a creditor 
na.tion by letting debtor nations pay their debts in goods 
39 
and services; and that the incree.sin6 imports showed 
the increasing purchasing power of t;he American people 
who searched world markets for the supplies which they 
. 40 
needed and desired. . 
Fu.rther support of the reciprooal trade agreements 
65 
was offered by 11.rthur Feiler, who shovJed that the nation.s 
of' the world as a whole realized the neoessi ty for adopting 
policies similar to that of' the United States, because the 
United States was probably pre-eminent in world trade and 
was leading the world f'orvmrd on a. c 01mEercial policy of 
freer trade and greti. tor exchange of' goods. In support of 
his theory, he pointed to the agreement between the United 
States, Great Britain, and France, which was the first 
step toward a more e table monetax•y condition in the world .. 41 
A statement as to the influence of Cordell Hull's 
trade prograi."'"!1 was provided in a st?.tement by VJ. Walter 
Crotch, who said. that a close associate of the :woreign 




~.' p. 2. 
Ibid.,p.5. -
Arthur Feiler, ncurrent Tendencies in Comraercial Pol-
ioy, n .tmH?rj.can Economic Reviev1, suppler.<J.ent, Menasha, 
Wisconsin) March, 193?, pp. 29-43. 
cited as being the germ of a rn.igh ty econo.mic block around 
whicb the :mino:c· :European states were grouping, and which 
by 1938 would be :po·we:rful erwugh to force pe,:1.ce upon the 
continent of Europe. 42 
66 
.As a final criticism and statement in regard. to Cordell 
Hull.ts reciprocal trade agreements program., i,Ia:x:well Ga 
Stewart thought that the ·trade agreements eliminated m1 ... 
economic restrictions an.d tb.us clec,red the vmy for a 
:renewed expansion of foreign trade. 43 In regard to the 
future o:r the reciprocal tra.cle agreements :prograrr1, both 
Houses or' Congresn :Passed th0 bill extending for a second 
period of three y0t:J . .rs the power of the President ·to 
negotiate reci.procal trade, through the Secretary of 
State. 44 
The author's conclusions are as follows: that the 
reciprocal ·trade agreements are a ste.tJ forward in stabi-
lizing the eco11omic relations of the world; that they are 
undoubtedly construe ted so as to exert an ap_pre,;iable in-
fluence on world peace; t;b.a t they have in.creased the 
foreign trade of the Uni i,ed Ste1tes to a certain e:x:te1rt, 
and as time past~os, they probably will increase the "trade 
to a g:reater extent; that they comprise the first step 
-----------------------· ~-~-~-
42. W. rial t;er Crotch, mn10 Heve:csal in 1!'inlano. 1 s Foreign 
:.Policy, Ii 1'he Con te:m:_porary Review, London, F.'ebruary, 
193'7, Il, 190. 
Idm·:'.well S. Ste,imrt, 1tHeacljustments He quired for cov-
' 11 Public Affairs, No. 11, Washington, H.l3'7 ,PP. 27-28. 
44. r·t Shaw, "Congreso,il Revievv gf Reviews) New York, 
April, 1937, :p. 13. 
of the United States in assur1ing pre-en1in.ence in intluence 
on "t116 trade :policies of the v;o:cld; that e. trade policy 
of that sort ts urgently necos::,ar.y to preserve an:i.icable 
relations betwoe:n the :)B0.[)10B of the 1,,0;orld; and that a 
return to the policy of' econorrric nationalism on "the part 
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